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Il  vaut  mieux  dire  que  le  gouvernement  le  plus  conforme  à  la  nature  est  celui  dont  la 
disposition particulière se rapporte mieux à la disposition du peuple pour lequel il est établi… 
Les lois politiques et civiles de chaque nation … doivent être tellement propres au peuple pour 
lequel elles sont faites, que c’est un très grand hasard si celles d’une nation peuvent convenir à 
une autre. 
Montesquieu De l’Esprit des Lois 
 
 
Can revolution be the proper end of just war? Unofficial arguments about the war in 
Iraq in 2003 seemed to suggest that it could. Official accounts at the time, of course, 
spoke in terms of international law and were framed in terms of two kinds of pre-
emption case, viz. that since Iraq was an immediate military threat (the ‘45 minute’ 
claim)  and  that  it  constituted  a  threat  to  international  security  and  order  (a  claim 
which invokes ch.VII of the UN Charter), attack was the most appropriate form of 
defence. But the publics concerned in the US, the UK and European states (as well as 
elsewhere) were encouraged to evaluate the legitimacy of war in terms of a ‘regime 
change’ that went beyond mere questions of security. The idea of democratisation was 
an important general theme in the public statements of Tony Blair and George Bush 
before and since.
1 And it was echoed in Central European states where some leading 
dissident  intellectuals  of  the  Soviet  era  came  out  in  favour  of  war  as  an  ‘anti-
totalitarian’ intervention (e.g. Adam Michnik, George Konrad, and Vaclav Havel).
2 
Since there was no immediate humanitarian crisis – there had been issues of genocide 
during the 1990s but these did not meet with a similar reponse – this was an argument 
about democratisation (i.e. democratic revolution) instigated by an external actor by Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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means  of  military  intervention.  Whereas  Srebrenica,  Rwanda,  and  Sierra  Leone, 
among other situations, helped put humanitarian intervention high on the agenda of 
contemporary normative international relations theory, therefore, Iraq did so with the 
issue of democratising dictatorships. 
In  terms  of  just  war  theory,  can  such  an  intervention  be  argued?  Can 
intervention serve as a substitute for revolution in countries governed by oppressive 
dictatorship?  During  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s,  the  question  was  debated 
between Michael Walzer, whose sceptical arguments drew on John Stuart Mill’s essay 
‘A Few words on Non-Intervention’ (1859),
3 and a series of critics. The casuistical 
aims of Walzer’s argument that the conditions sufficient for domestic revolution were 
not generally sufficient for foreign intervention reflected anxieties of the American 
Left  against  the  background  of what  they saw  as  neo-colonialist  war  in Vietnam. 
Rebuttals by Richard Wasserstrom, Gerald Doppelt, Charles Beitz, and David Luban, 
reflected  equal  anxiety  about  a  theory  that  seemed  too  permissive  with  regard  to 
foreign tyrannies with atrocious human rights records.
4 Both discourses clearly speak 
with renewed resonance in the political climates of North America and Europe after 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
The present article revisits Mill’s argument and its deployment by Walzer in 
order to elucidate anew the question of using intervention as a means of achieving 
domestic revolution in the states invaded.
5 In part 1, I outline the central tenets of the 
‘Mill-Walzer’ account of non-intervention, i.e. the reading of Mill through which the 
principle re-entered theoretical debates in the 1970s. In part 2, I present a critique of 
the  assumptions  underpinning  Mill’s  account  and,  in  3,  I  sort  through  some 
ambiguities in his terminology, ambiguities ignored or smoothed over in Walzer’s 
reading.  Finally,  in  part  4,  I  attempt  a  reconstruction  of  the  principle  of  non-Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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intervention on the basis of a more realistic set of empirical assumptions and a clearer 
use  of  political  terminology.  My  conclusion  presents  a  revised  version  of  Mill’s 
principle  that  seeks,  first,  to  retain  its  usefulness  as  a  ‘conservative’
6  restraint  on 
excessive interventionist zeal (ironically, a principle still central to the arguments of 
the Left rather than Right); but which, secondly, clarifies and expands the permissive 
space given over to legitimate interventions in political theory, thus satisfying the 
need  to  consider  assisting  some  democratic  movements  abroad,  a  prospect  whose 
intuitive appeal still attracts some intellectuals of both leftist and rightist persuasions. 
 
 
1. Nonintervention: Reading Mill Through Walzer. 
 
a. Self-Determination and Self-Help 
Writing in 1859, the same year as he published On Liberty, Mill argued that states 
should not, in general,  be interfered with, particularly with respect  to the  internal 
legitimacy  of  their  governments.  Mill’s  short  discussion  in  ‘A  Few  Words  on 
Nonintervention’ lays out an argument that it is self-defeating and therefore wrong to 
interfere in the affairs of another state with a view to accelerating its progress towards 
representative  democracy.  Mill  argued  that  the  attainment  of  liberties  and  free 
government for individuals was inextricable from a fundamental right of nations to 
self-determination. This right therefore had to be respected. Where self-determination 
was not allowed to occur – as when another country intervenes – liberties and free 
government would inevitably fail, resulting either in a return to domestic oppression 
or in the new oppression of foreign colonialism. Tyranny, therefore, was no just or 
prudent cause of war, and while it might provide conditions justifying revolution it Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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did not similarly justify even benign foreign intervention. A people suffering under 
grievous dictatorship would therefore not be entitled to or essentially benefit from 
military assistance by some well-intentioned foreign power. All states, as Michael 
Walzer put it, should be treated as ‘self-determining communities,’ irrespective of the 
extent  to  which  they  had  actually achieved  democratic  government  or  free  public 
debate.  
  To  use  Walzer’s  terms,  Mill  builds  on  a  basic  distinction  between  ‘self-
determination’  and  ‘political  freedom.’  The  legitimacy  of  states  might  be  judged 
domestically by the standard of political freedom in a liberal view. Self-determination, 
however, is the standard by which they are judged internationally. To judge thus is to 
decide on the basis of whether the shape of a given state has been determined by itself 
or  by  a  ‘foreign’  power.  As  Endre  Begby  writes  in  his  commentary,  ‘legitimacy 
abroad does not require legitimacy at home’ and to conflate the two constitutes a 
‘category mistake.’
7 Walzer therefore finds Mill arguing for a key tenet of what he 
calls the ‘legalist paradigm,’ viz. ‘that we  must take  care  not to  confuse  the self-
determination  of  a  community  with  the  political  freedom  of  the  community’s 
members’ by regarding a state as liable to just war internationally (i.e. as illegitimate) 
on the basis that it lacks legitimacy internally. 
Mill’s  argument  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  for  a  people  to  attain  to 
liberty,  it  is  necessary  for  them  to  engage  in  an  active  struggle  and  a  course  of 
progressive, historical development through which political culture and psychology 
are transformed. To be ruled by a tyrant, Mill says, is a ‘misfortune’ certainly. But it 
is only during an ‘arduous struggle to become free by their own efforts’ that  the 
virtues needed for free government have the best chance of springing up.
8 From this, 
Walzer  concludes,  intervention  is  not  merely  to  be  advised  against  as  something Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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unlikely to work but must be ruled out categorically. It fails ‘necessarily’ and ‘by 
definition’ based on the assumption ‘that the internal freedom of a community can 
only be won by the members of that community themselves.’
9 In his summary of Mill, 
Walzer therefore concludes that,  
 
A state is self-determining even if its citizens struggle and fail to establish free 
institutions, but it has been deprived of self-determination if such institutions 
are  established  by  an  intrusive  neighbour.  The  members  of  a  political 
community must seek their own freedom, just as the individual must cultivate 
his own virtue. They cannot be set free, as he cannot be made virtuous, by any 
external  force.  Indeed,  political  freedom  depends  upon  the  existence  of 
individual virtue,  and this the armies of another state are  most unlikely to 
produce – unless, perhaps, they inspire an active resistance and set in motion a 
self-determining politics. Self- determination is the school in which virtue is 
learned (or not) and liberty won (or not). 
 
Hence the principle of ‘non-intervention’: for Mill, the notion of self-determination 
signifies a people’s right, as he put it, ‘to become free by their own efforts’ if they 
can, and, as Walzer indicates, non-intervention is thus ‘the principle of guaranteeing 
that their success will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusions of an 
alien power.’
10 To safeguard such opportunities as may be available to peoples to 
overthrow their oppressive government and establish democracy, therefore, both Mill 
and Walzer conclude that it is necessary to tolerate oppressors in international affairs.  
 
 
b. The Legalist Paradigm 
Mill’s argument provides a positive, empirical and largely prudential account of the 
reasons why intervention should not take place. In Walzer’s rendition, it is used to 
establish the basis for the ethical-normative view that he identifies as the ‘legalist 
paradigm.’ This defines the rules governing interactions by states and, at their limit, Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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the crime of aggression. In outlining it, Walzer gives an amplified version of what he 
takes  to  be  Mill’s  position  in  three  important  areas:  first,  in  his  conception  of 
international  relations  as  a  ‘society  of  states;’  secondly,  in  his  notion  of  the  ‘fit’ 
between state and community; and thirdly, in his account of the exceptions to non-
intervention. 
The ‘legalist paradigm’ signifies a set of norms which Walzer takes to be at 
the heart of wide consensus in the just war tradition. Its central tenet is the legal 
doctrine of sovereignty, which, Walzer writes, ‘defines the liberty of states as their 
independence  from  foreign  control  and  coercion.’  The  ‘society  of  states’  is  the 
conception of international relations upon which the paradigm rests. Crucial to this 
society is the mutual respect accorded by states to the rights of other states. States 
have two fundamental rights: territorial integrity is one, and sovereignty is the other. 
Within this framework, Walzer argues that, even where that state fails to recognise 
human rights or democratic entitlements, there is at least a strong presumption against 
intervening in the affairs of another state.  
Walzer gives two reasons for respecting states as bearers of rights. The first 
has to do with the relationship between states and individual rights. Since rights do 
not exist in a vacuum, Walzer argues, but require political institutions for definition 
and  protection,  and  since  there  exist  no  global  political  institutions  capable  of 
providing  this,  the  state  is  the  only  real  context  within  which  such  rights  can  be 
expected.  It  is  therefore  essential  that  states,  their  territory  and  their  authority  be 
respected  as  repositories  of  such  human  rights  as  have  been  realised.  Secondly, 
Walzer stresses the need to respect order and diversity in the international realm: the 
survival of a society of states in which such plurality can occur and in which a war of Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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all against all can be avoided depends upon norms of behaviour. These norms are 
provided by the two basic rights of states.
11  
It  is  on  the  first  argument,  however,  that  Walzer  relies  more  heavily  in 
discussing  non-intervention.  Following  Mill,  Walzer  argues  that  although  not  all 
independent states are free,  
 
the  recognition  of  sovereignty  is  the  only  way  we  h
ave  of  establishing  an  arena  within  which  freedom  can  be  fought  for  and 
(sometimes) won. It is this arena and the activities that go on within it that we 
want to protect, and we protect them, much as we protect individual integrity, 
by  marking  out  boundaries  that  cannot  be  crossed,  rights  that  cannot  be 
violated. As with individuals, so with sovereign states: there are things that we 
cannot do for them, even for their own ostensible good.
12 
 
Walzer concludes, therefore, that there should be a ‘kind of a priori respect for state 
boundaries’ since they are the only ones they ever have and Mill’s principle of non-
intervention  gives  rise  to  the  maxim,  ‘always  act  so  as  to  recognise  and  uphold 
communal autonomy.’
13  
The rights of states, as Walzer hastened to emphasise in his defence of Just 
and Unjust Wars in 1980, are not ultimate principles but merely reflect the importance 
of ‘community’ as an embodiment of the rights of individuals. It is in this relation that 
he amplifies Mill’s account by making use of the idea of a ‘fit’. This community ‘rests 
most deeply’ on a Burkean, metaphorical ‘contract’ between ‘the living, the dead, and 
those who are yet to be born.’ Its historical origins are discoverable over the longue 
durée rather than in a singular contract and its normative foundations are found in the 
right  of  all  individuals  to  belong  to  a  community.
14  The  inviolability  of  state 
sovereignty arises from its privileged relationship with the community.
15 
Walzer asserts that there must be two ‘presumptions’ about peoples and states 
from  the  point  of  view  of  foreigners  contemplating  intervention.  The  first  is  a Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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presumption in favour of the legitimacy of a state based on the assumption that, for it 
to  exist  at  all,  there  must  be  a  certain  ‘fit’  between  community  and  government. 
Walzer  makes  his  case  for  Mill’s  principle  on  the  grounds  that  different  political 
cultures are epistemologically opaque to one-another. Foreigners, he writes, ‘are in no 
position’ to deny the integrity of the relationship between people and government 
because they have insufficient knowledge of the relevant history. They lack the ‘direct 
experience’ needed for understanding the ‘concrete judgements’ through which the 
community negotiated  its  ‘conflicts  and  harmonies’  and  established  ‘the  historical 
choices and cultural affinities, the loyalties and resentments, that underlie it’.
16 The 
second presumption is that if an attack were launched against the state in question, 
then its citizens would ‘think themselves bound to resist, and would in fact resist’. It 
must be assumed that ‘they value their own community in the same way that we value 
ours or in the same way that we value communities in general’ and will therefore 
subject themselves to the tyranny of war rather than let a foreign force take over.  
The  expectation  of  resistance  in  particular  grounds  the  moral  prohibition 
against  imposing  on  a  state  the  tyranny  of  war  in  Walzer’s  account:  ‘it  is  the 
expectation of resistance,’ he writes, ‘that establishes the ban on invasion.’
17 To the 
extent that we must assume citizens will fight – either voluntarily or by obligation – 
then  we  would  regard  any  action  against  them  as  one  of  ‘aggression’;
18 
correspondingly, where there is no such willingness, such an action would not, in fact, 
constitute aggression.
19 Where citizens are prepared to fight, Walzer assumes, then 
this reflects the continued existence of some kind of ‘fit’ between community and 
government, however residual. Fighting these citizens, therefore, constitutes not only 
a violation of their rights as individuals (‘it is to force men and women to risk their Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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lives for the sake of their rights’
20) but also their rights as members of a community, 
viz. to belong to and act through that community. 
In a third modification of the terms of ‘Non-intervention,’ where Mill had 
named explicitly only two exceptions to non-intervention, Walzer admits a third. Mill 
argued that it is permissible to assist in wars of national liberation, and to counter the 
illegitimate interventions of others by means of ‘counter-intervention.’ Walzer adds 
that it is necessary to permit humanitarian intervention in cases of genocide and other 
large-scale, simultaneous crimes against humanity.
21 Two quite different criteria are 
presented  for  justifying  exceptions:  the  first  requires  attackers  to  demonstrate  the 
‘urgency or extremity of a particular case’ as the basis for claiming that it constitutes 
an exception to the rule; the second criterion, however, suggests that these cases all sit 
somewhere outside the remit of the non-intervention rule and are therefore excluded 
from it categorically.
22 On the latter view, all three of the kinds of intervention that 
may be permitted are cases where the ‘fit’ between community and government that 
must be presumed at all other times manifestly no longer obtains. And where it no 
longer obtains, the assumption that citizens will fight is either no longer true (in the 
first and third cases) or is counterbalanced by the fact that fighting has already broken 
out  (as  in  the  second).
23  Thus,  would-be  attackers  may  cite  ‘rules  of  disregard’
24 
which mark the point where non-intervention no longer applies.
25  
But the possibility of overthrowing a regime by means of military intervention 
on grounds that it is oppressive even to the point of fairly extensive violence is ruled 
out by both Mill and Walzer. This appears as the unfortunate but necessary price for 
those whose greatest worry is that an activist, aggressive foreign policy would be 
encouraged by a more permissive theory of jus ad bellum. But Walzer’s critics have 
consistently stressed the different kind of permissiveness that his theory opens up, Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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arguing that it gives carte blanche to tyrannies with a record of persistent human 
rights abuse.
26 The most disadvantageous consequence of Walzer’s appropriation of 
Mill  is  that  it  effectively  protects  such  states  from  any  possibility  of  armed 
intervention  provided  their  governments  stop  short  of  outright  genocide  or  mass 
enslavement and manage to prevent the outbreak of a secessionist civil war. The three 
parts following in this essay therefore return to Mill’s arguments, first, re-examining 
and  re-evaluating  the  assumptions  that  underpin  them  (in  2  &  3)  and,  secondly, 
offering the possibility of reconstructing them in a more attractive way (4). 
 
 
2. ‘Merely domestic oppressors’:
27 Mill’s Assumptions 
 
This section initiates a critical analysis of Mill by highlighting three key assumptions 
that are made in his arguments on non-intervention, viz. a.) about the foundations of 
authority; b.) about the nature of liberty and its historical-cultural foundations; and, 
finally, c.) about the ability of peoples desiring and capable of self-rule to overthrow 
tyrants. The first two of these assumptions, I argue, constitute the major strength of 
Mill’s account as a source for theories seeking to limit interventions and to prevent 
foolhardy  or  malicious  ventures  from  taking  place.  But  the  third  assumption  is 
anachronistic,  lacking  empirical  credibility.  It  therefore  constitutes  a  significant 
weakness in Mill’s – and consequently Walzer’s – argument against intervention.  
 
 Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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a. A Fit between Government and Community   
The first pillar of Mill’s argument is the assumption that for a government to sustain 
itself, it needs in some way to match the kind of community over which it rules. If 
there  is  a  mismatch,  then  the  situation  will  tend  to  right  itself  in  favour  of  the 
community. While this theme was explicit and detailed in Mill’s Considerations on 
Representative Government (1861), in ‘Nonintervention’ it is largely implicit. But its 
presence is felt in the discussion of cases where a people has not yet overthrown 
despotic government. Mill is emphatic that, in such cases, it must be assumed that the 
people  have  not  yet  acquired  the  ‘feelings  and  the  virtues’
28  needed  for  free 
government.
29 The ‘fit’ (as Walzer calls it) implied between despotic government and 
the community over which it rules must, at the very least, then involve the absence of 
a  will  for  any  other  kind  of  government.  In  Representative  Government  Mill 
elaborates further on what must be lacking in such a case. A people requires three 
characteristics  before  representative  government  is  sustainable  and  therefore 
appropriate: first, the people ‘should be willing to receive it.’ The possibility that they 
will not be and that they may, in fact, remain attached to a despotic ruler remains 
open. The second requirement is that ‘they should be willing and able to do what is 
necessary for its preservation.’ Finally, ‘they should be willing and able to fulfil the 
duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them.’ Despotic governments 
‘fit’ where any one or more of these factors is lacking.
30 Although Mill remarks in 
another part of ‘Nonintervention’ that ‘a despotic government only exists by military 
power,’
31  his  account  generally  suggests  that  the  survival  of  such  governments  is 
sustained by the presence of some specific cultural attributes or at least by the absence 
of others. It therefore supports a strong presumption against trying to impose what Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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may be ‘ideally’ the best kind of government in what are evidently not ideally the best 
kinds  of  circumstances,  a  view  which  counsels  caution  (we  might  call  it 
‘conservatism’) in foreign policy.  
In Walzer’s amplified reading, he  says that Mill ‘generally writes as if he 
believes that citizens get the government they deserve, or, at least, the government for 
which they are “fit”.’ Thus, if military force is important for despotism, it is effective 
only to the extent that the populace allows it to be. In Walzer’s version, Mill believes 
that a tyrant attempting to rule a people that has the will to free itself will eventually 
be overthrown (and the people learn virtue, the capacity for self-rule, through this 
act); therefore if a tyrant appears to be ruling successfully, then we assume that he 
must have at least the passive consent of his subjects, i.e. the absence of a will (and 
hence ability) to be ruled otherwise.
32 The idea of a ‘fit’ between a government and its 
subject community is developed further in Walzer’s communitarian language in ‘The 
Moral Standing of States’: ‘[t]he history, culture, and religion of the community,’ he 
writes, ‘may be such that authoritarian regimes come, as it were, naturally, reflecting 
a widely shared world view or way of life.’
33 Thus, he continues, ‘though the ‘fit’ 
between government and community is not of a democratic sort, there is still a ‘fit’ of 
some sort, which foreigners are bound to respect.’
34 Walzer develops this aspect of 
Mill’s account further in the idea of communities whose cultural attributes may be 
reflected in a multitude of different constitutional forms, a notion that goes some way 
beyond  Mill  in  its  pluralism.  But  the  principle  remains  the  same:  representative 
government is only suited to some peoples some of the time. 
Both versions of the argument participate in a tradition of political thought 
which  originated  with  David  Hume  and  became  more  strongly  ‘conservative’  in 
colour with Burke. Even tyranny does not usually rule by force alone:
35 it usually Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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relies on some basis of support. For Hume this basis was found in ‘opinion’; more 
recently,  Hannah  Arendt  articulated  an  alternative  version  of  this  idea  with  the 
definition of ‘power’ she offered in her essay On Violence, where all power, properly 
speaking, is based in ‘empowerment’ by those who accept its authority (though there 
is also something quite different called ‘obedience’; it is this, rather than ‘power’ as 
Mae Tse Tung asserted, that flows from the barrel of a gun).
36 Whether in Mill’s 
leaner  argument  or  Walzer’s  communitarian  version,  as  an  initial  presumption 
(subject to revision in some circumstances as I argue below) this argument is a useful 
one,  counselling  well-grounded  prudence  and  helping  to  narrow  down 
permissiveness.  Generally,  we  take  it  as  a  prima  facie  assumption  that,  whatever 
government exists in a state ‘fits’ its people, even if it is not one that we think is 
‘legitimate’ according to liberal canons.  
 
 
b. The Conditions of Liberty 
Mill’s  second  assumption  involves  the  belief  that  ‘liberty’  is  insufficient  from  a 
political point of view if we hold it to mean merely ‘negative liberty’ (e.g. in Isaiah 
Berlin’s sense). Politically adequate liberty or freedom cannot be enjoyed simply by 
removing anyone or anything standing in the way of our desires: we cannot, that is, 
merely  step  in  and  overthrow  a  dictator  and  expect  a  society  to  emerge 
instantaneously  in  which  the  ideals  of  Mill’s  essay  On  Liberty  are  enjoyed.  Our 
desires, after all, can include such things as the security of someone else telling us 
what we should do and (as the first assumption suggests) a people liberated from a 
tyrant  with  whom  they  were  not  particularly  discontent  might  well  seek  a 
replacement.
37 It is therefore important to bear in mind that Mill’s political philosophy Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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was  concerned  with  two  kinds  of  liberty,  the  social  and  the  political:  in  Mill’s 
terminology, this is reflected in his interrelated concerns with liberty qua freedom 
from interference by others and representative or ‘free’ government, understood as the 
institutions  best  designed  to  enhance,  protect  and  contribute  to  the  exercise  of 
meaningful freedom. A state which meets both conditions (ideally the best form of 
state) is radically different, clearly, from the general licence that would be seen if free 
government were given to a people just liberated from slavery, as Mill suggests in 
Representative Government.
38  
For a state to achieve freedom and be able to sustain it, it needs both the social 
space for exercising private, negative freedom (of the kind analysed in On Liberty) 
and  the  kind  of  free  government  envisaged  in  Representative  Government.  While 
conceptually distinct, neither can survive without the other.  Mill’s liberal politics 
therefore requires careful consideration of the positive conditions required to achieve 
successful ‘free’ institutions as well the negative precondition of removing tyrannical 
ones. To be effective and to survive, as ‘Nonintervention’ argues, liberty and free 
government  require  ‘virtues’.  In  this  respect,  Mill  follows  the  tendency  of  early-
modern (like more recent) republican theorists who maintain that liberty is a kind of 
practice, requiring skills, values, beliefs, habits, in short, what neo-Roman theorists 
called ‘virtues’ in order to come into existence.
39 Political order, for example, is best 
served by industry, integrity and prudence; progress, through which a society sustains 
itself  by  setting  goals,  benefits  from  mental  activity,  energy  and  courage.
40 
Furthermore, it is specific to certain kinds of political culture, i.e. liberal cultures, the 
cultures of free states, and absent from others, e.g. despotisms, tyrannies, anarchies, 
and colonial provinces. To make the transition from despotism to democracy, it is not 
sufficient, therefore, merely to kill the despot (who is basically the inessential part); Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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instead, it is necessary to envisage a path of historical, progressive development with 
a strongly pedagogic component.
41 Mill’s general concern with this is clearly evident 
from  his  emphasis  on  processes  of  ‘enlightened’  progress  in  On  Liberty  and 
Representative Government. Again, along with the first assumption, this helps support 
a generally conservative view on regime change by suggesting that to ‘free’ a people 
requires something substantially more than merely to remove their oppressors.  
 
 
c. Force and Freedom 
Both of the first two pillars of Mill’s argument are closely related to elements of the 
civic republican tradition. They both contribute to what may be called, to borrow 
Philip Pettit’s term, Mill’s ‘consequentialist republicanism.’
42 In Pettit’s account, this 
amounts  to  the  rejection  of  deontological  views  of  liberty  that  envisage  imposing 
preconceived  constitutions  on  any  given  community  irrespective  of  its  specific 
cultural  characteristics.  For  Mill,  it  is  most  clearly  seen  in  his  arguments  in 
Representative Government where he argues that, although it is ideally the best form 
of government for those states capable of supporting it, representative government is 
not suitable in states that have yet to achieve the right kind of political culture. Its 
effects, as he argues in that text, would actually be detrimental, for instance, if it were 
imposed on a people used to living in slavery. For peoples that have not yet arrived at 
a level of progress suitable for representative institutions, a range of other possibilities 
present themselves as interim measures whose suitability is measured according to the 
extent to which they can contribute to progressive development on the long run.
43 
The  third  assumption  underpinning  Mill’s  view  is  the  apparent  belief  that 
force could not prevail over an adequate will to be free. Mill writes that if a people Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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suffers tyranny ‘only with native rulers,’ i.e. rulers without foreign military support to 
keep them in power, ‘and with such native strength as those rulers can enlist in their 
defence,’  then  there  is  generally  no  case  to  be  made  for  intervening  to  support 
revolution. The reason, he writes, is  
 
that there can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, 
even if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves. The only 
test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become fit for popular 




There  is  some  vagueness  in  Mill’s  account  here  against  which  Walzer’s  reading 
appears rather too decisive. Walzer infers from Mill’s argument the conclusion that 
‘force could not prevail … over a people ready’ to brave the struggle with tyranny. In 
other words, a domestic tyrant could not possibly resist the force of a genuine popular 
movement for liberty. From the passage quoted, however, Mill appears to ignore and 
therefore  to  leave  open  the  possibility  that  a  movement  sufficiently  desirous  and 
capable  of  free  government  were  it  to  be  established  could  still  be  defeated  by 
domestic military forces.  
Whether  or  not  Mill  believed  it,  the  idea  that  any  willing  and  ‘virtuous’ 
populace  will  necessarily  be  able  to  challenge  the  government  in  command 
notwithstanding the means of violence at the disposal of the state seems anachronistic 
in contemporary politics and against the background of twentieth-century historical 
experience. It may (or may not) have been true in 1859, but political history suggests 
that the balance shifted subsequently in favour of governments with the development 
of  military  technologies  of  greater  effectiveness.  The  experience  of  revolutionary 
failure in Russia during 1905, for instance, led activists in Europe to believe that even 
armed and popular uprisings face the prospect of bloody defeat against a militarily Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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strong state.
45 After WWII, as Hannah Arendt noted in 1969, this fact of modern state 
violence was impressed upon global political consciousness by the Soviet repressions 
in  Hungary  in  1956  and  in  Czechoslovakia  in  1968.  Admittedly  these  latter 
constituted foreign interventions – a case which Mill recognised – but since then, the 
image of protesters facing domestic Chinese tanks in Tienanmin Square has driven the 
point home: if a government retains the support of a sufficient proportion of the army, 
it can resist even the most capable and determined movement for free government. To 
put it crudely, then, if Walzer is correct in his reading of ‘Non-intervention,’ we might 
say that the problem with Mill’s theory is that he had never seen an army tank. Tanks 
in Tienanmin Square symbolise for us the fact, stressed by Arendt, that no amount of 
popular  power  can win  against  a  determined  government armed  to  the  teeth  with 
modern weaponry.
46 
Whether  or  not  Mill  would  have  entertained  such  a  possibility  is  less  the 
concern of the present paper, however, than the question of whether or not it could 
occur as an empirical reality (a question to which I return in 3.b). In any case, Mill’s 
ambiguity on the question arises from a lack of clarity in his argument, criticism of 
which  opens  up  both  his  and  Walzer’s  principle  of  non-intervention  for  partial 
revision. As I argue in section 3.a, Mill’s account does not adequately distinguish 
between, on the one hand, the will and virtues needed for representative government, 
and, on the other, the military-logistical capacity to confront the armed forces of the 
state. This tends to support Walzer’s conclusion. Clarifying the difference allows us to 
reopen a possibility that the Mill-Walzer account has closed off, as I show in 3.b. 
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3. Challenging Mill 
 
a. The Virtues of self-rule  
Mill’s argument and Walzer’s appropriation both rest on a set of key terms found in 
‘A  Few  Words  on  Nonintervention,’  terms  which  are  not  always  as  clearly 
distinguished  as  they  might  be.  In  particular,  I  want  to  argue  that  an  important 
ambiguity arises from Mill’s conflation of three distinct factors affecting the viability 
of  revolutions  and  free  governments,  viz.  those  virtues  needed  as  qualities  in  the 
citizens who will rule themselves; secondly, the will for free government; and, thirdly, 
the resources needed for successful armed uprising. It is by conflating the three and 
treating them as, in effect, a single matter, that Mill’s account appears to rule out all 
possibility  of  a  successful  intervention  on  behalf  of  an  embattled  but  legitimate 
revolution. The confusion of different elements is seen particularly in relation to what 
he calls ‘the feelings and the virtues needful for maintaining freedom’. 
In ‘Nonintervention,’ Mill refers a number of times and in different ways to 
what is needed by a people in order to sustain free government (‘a people’s having 
become fit for popular institutions.’). He writes that they must be ‘willing to brave 
labour and danger for their liberation’;
47 that they must have ‘sufficient love of liberty 
to be able to wrest it from merely domestic oppressors;’ that they must be ‘determined 
to be [free]’ and ‘value it sufficiently to fight for it.’
 48 He also writes of the ‘feelings 
and virtues’ needed as well as the need to appreciate, devote themselves to, and ‘value 
their country’s interest above their own.’
49 A people capable of sustaining popular 
institutions  must  have  the  ability  to  ‘maintain  it  against  any  force  which  can  be 
mustered within the country’
50 and be ‘capable of defending and of making a good use Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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of free institutions.’
51 In these latter remarks, Mill clearly means that the people must 
be capable both of wresting their liberty from an existing despotic government and of 
defending it once they have control of government.  
Thus, in Mill’s account, there is, on the one hand, the ability of a revolutionary 
movement for democracy to defeat a government in power. It is this which he says 
provides empirical proof to outsiders that the people in question is capable of popular 
government. On the other hand, he speaks of the virtues needed for sustaining free 
government. Both appear to include, above all, a great desire for free government 
resulting in a resolute will to attain it. But when Mill writes of the ‘virtues’ needed for 
free government, what will these include? Aside from military capability and desire, 
‘Nonintervention’ tells us little about them. If we turn, however, to Representative 
Government (published two years after ‘Nonintervention’) as we did before, Mill is 
more  explicit:  essential  to  the sustainability  of  representative  government, he  said 
there, are three things, viz. a willingness to receive it, a willingness and ability to do 
what is needed to preserve it, and a willingness to carry out the duties it requires of 
citizens.  In  that  context,  little  is  said  of  military  virtù,  and  much  more  about  the 
‘enlargement’ of the mind and sentiments necessary for citizens who are potentially to 
occupy public offices and who must participate in various roles in civil society. In 
other words, the virtues needed to sustain representative government consist largely in 
enlightened education and the moral capacity to perform one’s duty.  
If we take the two discussions together – from ‘Nonintervention’ and from 
Representative Government – there are, therefore, two distinct sets of virtues which, 
in the earlier essay, Mill treats as one. On the one hand, there are those which are 
required in the aggressive act of challenging an illegitimate government in power, 
including, presumably, logistical capabilities, martial courage and a willingness to Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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risk life and limb in confrontation with the powers of the state, strategic and tactical 
nous, and the possession of arms sufficient for battle along with the capacity to use 
them;  on  the  other,  there  are  those  required  to  sustain  an  existing  representative 
government and protect it from corruption. (Both require a strong will for freedom to 
support them.) What I want to argue is that, while the first set of virtues might be a 
good  indicator  that  the  second  exist  or  will  be  learnt,  they  are  nonetheless  quite 
distinct and it is therefore possible on the basis of these principles that a successful 
representative  democracy  can  be  conceived  where  the  people  had  not  confronted 
earlier despotic government in domestic revolution. 
To support this view from within Mill’s discussions, it may be argued, for 
instance, that the kinds of threat faced by a democratic movement in opposition are 
very  different  from  those  faced  by  democratic  citizens  occupying  roles  in 
representative  institutions.  In  the  former  case  the  danger  is  defeat  by  force  and 
repression  and  it  must  therefore  be  met  by  a  willingness  and  ability  to  fight.  In 
‘Nonintervention,’ however, the key danger that an existing republic would face lies 
not in the direct confrontation of soldiers but in a lack of integrity among its officials: 
 
Either the government which it has given to itself, or some military leader or 
knot of conspirators who contrive to subvert the government, will speedily put 
an end to all popular institutions: unless indeed it suits their convenience better 
to leave them standing, and be content with reducing them to mere forms; for, 
unless the spirit of liberty is strong in a people, those who have the executive 
in their hands easily work any institutions to the purposes of despotism. There 
is no sure guarantee against this deplorable issue, even in a country which has 
achieved its own freedom…
52 
 
In the face of such a threat, is a willingness to fight the first virtue that democratic 
government  requires?  The  general  argument  of  Representative  Government  would 
seem to suggest instead that it is the cultivation of ethically virtuous citizens who Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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perform their own duties diligently and who are vigilant in ensuring that others do not 
usurp  popular  authority.  This  cultivation  might  well  occur  in  the  ‘school’  of 
revolutionary contestation, but we might also imagine (as Mill does in Representative 
Government) that it can sometimes occur without such a fight. 
 
 
b. Four Scenarios 
A conceptual distinction is therefore supportable between political virtues, properly 
speaking,  and  the  military  capabilities  that  may  be  required  in  confronting  a 
government in power. The possibility that I want to open up on this basis – and which 
is  effectively  suppressed  in  the  Mill-Walzer  account  –  can  be  seen  clearly  if  we 
consider the range of possible scenarios that the two authors envisage. Mill’s account 
in  ‘Non-intervention’  clearly  indicates  two  opposite  possibilities  of  fit  between 
government and people: 
1.  Pure  despotism:  this  appears  where  the  presence  of  political  tyranny  is 
matched by the absence of any ‘spirit of liberty’ among the people, i.e. of 
democratic will and democratic virtues. 
2.  Pure democracy: by this term I designate those cases where free government 
emerges in the face of tyranny due to the proven strength of democratic will 
and  it  succeeds  and  survives  due  to  virtues  learnt  during  the  course  of 
revolutionary struggle. 
So  far  as  purely  domestic  situations  are  concerned  (i.e.  those  free  from  foreign 
interference), Mill’s account can seem – and seemed to Walzer – to rule out any other 
possibilities. Both Mill and Walzer discuss in explicit terms only one other possibility Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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for foreign intervention against domestic tyrannies, viz. the idea of a misfit created by 
unjustified intervention: 
3.  Misfit (1): where there is a free government due to intervention but the people 
possess neither sufficient will nor virtue for achieving or sustaining it. 
It was this that both Mill and Walzer sought to avoid in foreign policy and their 
arguments are effective in showing how it would lead in the short to medium term 
either to a return to 1. or to a colonial occupation. What I want to argue is that there is, 
in fact, a fourth possibility that appears to be ruled out but which must at least be 
conceivable as a hypothetical scenario: 
4.  Misfit (2): this is the case where tyrannical government continues to exist but 
where both democratic will and virtues also appear.  
This possibility becomes apparent when we introduce the distinction glossed 
over  in  Mill  and  Walzer,  viz.  between  the  ‘virtues’  needed  for  sustained  self-
government  and  the  means  needed  for  successful  enforcement.  The  former  might 
include things like public spirit and the love of freedom itself (both possibilities that 
Mill stresses) as well as patriotism, honesty and prudence in political leaders, etc, not 
to mention enlightenment and education. These virtues enable a people to rule itself 
and  to  monitor  those  in  positions  of  authority.  They  encourage  vigilance  and 
scrupulous behaviour, and provide the basis for a military ethic sufficient for resisting 
invaders  or  would-be  domestic  tyrants.  The  latter,  which  neither  Mill  nor  Walzer 
distinguish in this context, would include the technologies, materiel, and the logistics 
of violence generally monopolised by the modern state. A fourth case would emerge 
where  the people possessed the former but not the  latter,  i.e. where they had the 
virtues needed for successful management of their state and a desire for freedom but 
were  prevented  from  taking  up  the  reigns  of  government  because  they  have Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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insufficient military means to defeat a well-armed dictator supported by the army. 
Were this to occur in a particular case, Mill’s otherwise prudent first presumption 
about the fit between government and community would be subject to reconsideration 
and could be overturned. 
The  fourth  possibility  can be  elucidated  further by using Hannah Arendt’s 
terms  of  reference.  Arendt’s  analysis  of  violence  and  political  power  is  in  many 
respects consonant with Mill’s and Walzer’s, as I suggested above, arguing that even 
dictatorial rule generally has to be empowered by some group before it can impose its 
violence on the rest of society. But she makes clear that an exception is possible: 
 
Violence, we must remember, does not depend on numbers or opinions, but on 
implements, and the implements of violence, […] like all other tools, increase 
and multiply human strength. Those who oppose violence with mere power 
will soon find that they are confronted not by men but by men’s artefacts, 
whose inhumanity and destructive effectiveness increase in proportion to the 
distance separating the opponents. Violence can always destroy power; out of 
the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most 
instant and perfect obedience.
53 
 
What Arendt envisages is the situation where a democratic majority, seeking self-rule 
and in all respects capable of sustaining it, is prevented from attaining it by a tiny 
minority whose strength has been  artificially  multiplied through the possession of 
modern arms. A mathematical equation thus emerges where the power of government, 
multiplied  by  strength  drawn  artificially  from  the  instruments  of  violence,  proves 
equal to or greater in force than the power arising from the will of the democratic 
majority.  In  such  a  situation,  were  the  effects  of  possessing  arms  neutralised  or 
counter-balanced on the side of the people, therefore, a successful revolution would 
take place. The decisive factor swinging events in another direction is not the balance 
of political forces as such, but the possession of military capability. Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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4. Reconstructing Non-intervention 
 
If such a case can occur – and I suggest that it is possible – then, I would argue, there 
exists a prima facie case for legitimate foreign intervention with the express intention 
of defeating domestic tyranny. Two things would be required, however, to develop 
this case: first, the relationship between the exception proposed and those endorsed by 
Mill and Walzer needs to be clarified; secondly, some preliminary attention needs to 
be given to the indicators that might be established for judging when a people can be 
deemed ready for intervention.  
 
 
a. An Exception to Non-Intervention 
There are two ways in which the exception I propose can be assimilated to those 
allowed  in  the  Mill-Walzer  account:  first  in  terms  of  counter-intervention  and, 
secondly,  in  the  terms  in  which  humanitarian  intervention  is  discussed.  In  Mill’s 
argument, counter-intervention is justified on the grounds that the natural balance of 
forces in a civil conflict has been upset by artificial factors (i.e. foreign troops). He 
writes that where a people fights against a ‘foreign yoke, or against a native tyranny 
upheld by foreign arms,’ the reasons for non-intervention cease to exist. In these kinds 
of situation, it is sometimes the case that no amount of attachment to freedom or 
ability  to  defend  and  ‘make  good  use’  of  ‘free  institutions’  could  ‘contend 
successfully  for  them  against  the  military  strength  of  another  nation  much  more 
powerful.’ Because of the imbalance that this foreign, military element introduces, he 
argues, intervention would not ‘disturb the balance of force on which the permanent Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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maintenance of freedom in a country depends’; rather, it would ‘redress that balance 
when it is already unfairly and violently disturbed.’
54  
  I propose taking Hannah Arendt’s distinctions and bringing them to bear on 
Mill’s account here:  if we accept  the proposition that the instruments of violence 
(including  weapons  and  specialist  expertise)  multiply  artificially  the  capacity  of 
persons to command obedience, irrespective of their ‘power’ (Arendt) or, as Walzer 
would put it, of the ‘fit’ between government and community, then it is possible to 
argue that these materials themselves constitute a foreign and artificial weight in the 
balance of political forces in the country. As with virtues, the term ‘forces’ in Mill’s 
account  contains  different  elements  which  could  usefully  be  distinguished  as  he 
assimilates political will, virtues, and coercive force (weapons, training, etc) under the 
one term. If we distinguish, therefore, the will and virtues from the coercive forces, 
then, intervention may be presented in a similar light in the case I suggest above 
(where revolution has broken out but is being suppressed by force) to Mill’s case for 
counter-intervention: foreign military aid would constitute a counter-weight against 
the artificial weight of coercive power monopolised by the state. While the terms 
justifying counter-intervention could thus be appropriated to legitimate democratic 
interventions  against  violent  governments,  however,  they  would  still  constitute  a 
distinct, fourth exception. 
An important objection which needs to be anticipated to the line of argument I 
have taken was suggested by Walzer in 1980, viz. that if an army is prepared to fight 
and  defend  the  government,  then  it  must  be  assumed  that  a  ‘fit’  still  remains, 
sufficient to render any intervention unjustifiable. One way to respond to this is to 
borrow  again  from  Walzer  and  argue  that  the  case  I  introduce  is  analogous  with 
another one of the exceptions he allows, namely that of humanitarian intervention. As Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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he argues in ‘The Moral Standing of States,’ where an army engages in genocidal or 
equivalent  actions,  then  this  indicates  the  absence  of  a  meaningful  ‘fit’  between 
government  and  community,  thus  justifying  intervention.
55  In  such  a  case, 
presumably, the misfit occurs, not between the army and the community in which it is 
rooted, but between the army and the community whose rights the soldiers violate and 
whose lives they forcibly take. (Alternatively, it could mean that the army, having 
become  a  community  unto  itself,  has  effectively  separated  itself  and  the  state  it 
supports  from  the  people  as  a  whole;  if  Walzer  intended  this,  it  would  help  my 
argument  even  more  but  his  remarks  on  armies  seem  to  suggest  that  they  must 
generally be assumed to have social roots outside the ranks.
56) If this is the case, then 
it could support an interpretation of counter-revolutionary repression as signifying an 
analogous misfit where the soldiers (or the soldiers plus the minority with which they 
have a ‘fit’) no longer fit the majority. This might be construed as a civil war where 
the force of a small minority is artificially multiplied by its monopoly of most of the 
technologies of violence. That being the case, there is sufficient reason to intervene in 
terms  similar  to  those  of  humanitarian  intervention.  But,  again,  the  exception  is 
different  even  though  it  could  be  argued  in  a  similar  way:  it  would  constitute  a 
deliberate  attempt  to  facilitate  democratic  revolution  rather  than  a  humanitarian 
intervention as such (though it might serve this purpose too). 
 
 
b. When are people ‘ready’? 
Before concluding, it is necessary to reflect for a moment on what signs could be 
identified to show when a people is ‘ready’ for assistance. For Mill, free government 
arising  from  successful  revolution  is  a  proxy  indicator  for  political  virtue  and Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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democratic  will  and  it  is  the  only  one  he  considers.  The  question  which  needs 
answered is whether it would be possible in principle to delineate a set of empirical 
tests by which to judge situations on a case-by-case basis to see whether virtue and 
will  of  sufficient  magnitude  exist  to  sustain  representative  government  but  in  the 
absence of revolutionary success. To do so in detail would go somewhat beyond the 
scope of the present article, but I would suggest the following: first, the development 
of civil society has become a standard indicator in the analysis of states suffering from 
disadvantageous  political  institutions,  one  that  has  been  applied  in  discussions  of 
Central-Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Islamic states of North Africa and the Middle 
East, for instance. To use Ernest Gellner’s phrase, the presence of non-governmental 
organisations and the vibrancy of civil life are necessary ‘conditions of liberty.’ But 
they are clearly not sufficient conditions and we would require, secondly, that there 
were indications of a properly political will for change. This would be evaluated on 
the basis of whether there exists a political movement for democracy, the existence of 
democratic  parties  of  various  kinds,  the  publication  of  political  journals  and 
opposition  literature,  etc.  Finally,  and  following  the  first  two  principles  of  Mill’s 
argument, there would need to be an actual revolutionary confrontation. As part 2 
argued above, the presumption that even tyrannical governments may reflect salient 
features of the communities they rule and the recognition that political liberty has 
cultural  and  social  preconditions  that  require  sometimes  long-term  historical 
development remain persuasive. Before these presumptions could be set aside and a 
legitimate intervention conceded, there would have to be evidence that the ‘fit’ that 
Walzer writes about had been ruptured. Moreover, as Walzer’s general arguments on 
jus  ad  bellum  tend  to  support,  there  would  also  be  a  moral  requirement  that  no 
bloodletting be initiated until the people in question had shown itself willing to endure Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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it and make the sacrifice. For this, a revolutionary breakdown would be the only real 
indicator. Unfortunately, this will mean that in situations where repression has already 
occurred and effectively crushed opposition, the absence of any articulate democratic 
energies will rule out the possibility of interventions on the basis here proposed. Such 
regimes will provide no indications that the people are ready for transition. Terroristic 
or totalitarian regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein, therefore, will remain outside 
the scope of any exception to the principle of non-intervention based on arguments 
about  democratisation  (but  still  subject  to  the  possibility  of  humanitarian 
intervention). 
Where the modification to Mill’s principle would enter is the point at which a 
democratic  revolution  appeared  likely  to  collapse  under  the  pressure  of  violent 
military repression. In such a scenario, the willingness of a people to brave danger and 
hardship  could  be  shown  without  succeeding  in  revolution.  To  use  a  recent 
illustration,  during  the  Orange  Revolution  in  Ukraine,  the  effectiveness  of  street 
protest  and  intelligent  use  of  the  media  manifested  a  strong  will  for  democratic 
changes and an end to corrupt government. Ultimately, a peaceful transition occurred 
as government decided against armed confrontation. But it was certainly possible that 
Victor  Yanukovich,  the  President,  could  have  responded  differently,  sending  the 
military against the crowds, and in such a scenario military repression might have 
succeeded.
57 The decisive factor, therefore, could well have been a matter of how the 
government  and  military  chose  to  react.  There  were  thus  two  ways  in  which  the 
situation could have unfolded: one, the actual outcome, where the decision against 
using military coercion ensured that the effective ‘balance of forces’ included only 
political, legal and moral elements; two, a counter-factual but apparently very real 
possibility  at  the  time,  where  the  moral  and  political  weight  of  the  revolution Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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confronted that of the government and its supporters plus the coercive force of the 
military.  It is arguable that in the latter case, arms would have affected the outcome 
artificially and could then have provided grounds for assisting the revolutionaries. 
The question then may be asked whether we should have regarded the revolution as 
insufficiently  motivated  or  virtuous  to  succeed  on  the  basis  that  the  state  had 
suppressed  it  militarily;  given  its  apparent  success,  this  judgement  is  certainly 
questionable in hindsight. On the other hand, the case of Iraq in 2003 would be very 




The  present  essay  identifies  three  key  assumptions  underpinning  the  Mill-Walzer 
argument;  and  by  outlining  these,  it  establishes  a  critical  position  from  which  to 
challenge  the  principle  of  non-intervention  and  to  suggest  a  reconstruction.  In 
particular, Mill’s argument appears to suggest (and Walzer clearly states) that if a 
people has the will  to remove  a regime  and sufficient virtue for self-rule,  then it 
follows that it will be possible for them to do so. On the basis of this assumption, the 
Mill-Walzer account maintains that any effort to remove an oppressive regime and 
replace it with a more democratic one is, in Michael Walzer’s words, necessarily 
bound  to  fail.  The  present  article  argues  that  Mill’s  account  is  dated  in  that  it 
underestimates the capacity of governments to instigate repressive measures against 
movements  for  democracy.  Once  the  capacity  of  governments  to  instigate  such 
repression is recognised, it becomes clear that Mill’s conclusions must be altered: 
interventions  against  such  governments  may  be  permissible  under  circumstances Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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where a democratic movement for change manifests itself but where it is unlikely to 
succeed due to the violence at the disposal of the state. 
  Once the possibility is reopened within Mill’s account that a valid democratic 
movement could confront unsuccessfully a tyrannical government then his account 
can be reconstructed in a way that is more attractive than Walzer’s reading allows. 
The attractions of this idea may be expressed in terms of Rawls’s ideal of reflective 
equilibrium: there are two quite contrary moral intuitions operating in contemporary 
theory and public discourse (and they are often held by the same people). The first 
sees the assistance of liberation movements abroad as attractive and the idea of sitting 
idly by while foreign dictatorships are allowed to prolong their existence abhorrent; 
the second is unwilling to countenance the adventurism of foreign interventions on 
grounds  of  prudence.  Once  reconstructed,  Mill’s  account  can  accommodate  both 
intuitions  while  providing  a  principle  by  which  to  adjudicate  between  them:  the 
principle of assistance is recognised in the possibility that it could work in certain 
limited situations; the principle of conservatism is accepted in a mitigated form where 
a  presumption  against  intervention  remains  in  place  in  most  cases  based  on  the 
assumption that, without clear contrary indications, even authoritarian governments 
are  sustained  by  at  least  acquiescence  and  even  positive  support  and  in  such 
circumstances the preconditions of free government are unlikely to obtain. Thus, both 
intuitions can be accommodated within a manageable political framework. 
The endorsement of a restricted set of cases where democratic interventions 
could be permitted in principle, however, is limited by a series of additional concerns 
both within the terms of just war theory and outside. First of all, the question of moral 
authority remains a tortuous one in an era when the UN is hamstrung by its Security 
Council procedures and the only force seemingly capable of supplying much of the Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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strength in intervening – the US – has a highly problematic status in the eyes of 
people in many states. The status of such interventions is rendered problematic from 
another point of view by the fact that they are not permitted by international law; this 
means that, while moral and political principles might allow for an intervention to 
assist  in  revolution,  legal  principles  could  only  be  invoked  in  justification  where 
repression had turned into genocide or created a humanitarian disaster of equivalent 
magnitude.  Interventions Beyond Mill    C. Finlay 
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